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As a body composed of the governments of the major nations on earth, 
the United Nations is a powerful diplomatic peace negotiator and world 
actor. Its ability to function as it was designed is of the utmost 
importance to international security. With the UN we have a chance to 
make peace a reality for the world; without it, we face a multitude of 
states acting in self-interest and at cross purposes. Through a 
comparison of current and past UN operations using the UN’s own 
criteria for success, this paper highlights several inadequacies in current 
United Nations peacekeeping operations. This paper then examines the 
potential causes of this inadequacy and the potential consequences if it 
continues. Finally, there will be a consideration of policy options that 
the UN could pursue in order to address these problems which 




The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important 
function of the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by 
which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United 
Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today.1 
 
                                                 
1 "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations." The United Nations, 
accessed 9 December 2011, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/  
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The quote above comes from the first page of the ‘Brahimi Report’.2  
Published in 2000, the UN report was a self-critical analysis designed 
to identify what needed to change within the UN structure so that, 
through effective peacekeeping, the international organization could 
meet its founding principle. 
 
As the Cold War dominated international politics until the early 
1990s, United Nations conflict mediation was exclusive to 
circumstanceswhere the Soviets and Americans did not support or 
oppose a side in the conflict. Where these rare situations did occur, 
peacekeeping was the United Nations response. When the Cold War 
ended, humanitarian disasters in places such as Somalia, Bosnia, 
Haiti, Rwanda, and Kosovo gained the attention of the world and 
peacekeeping, under the same principles, was often the expected 
response to these crises. But new problems require new solutions, 
and it is through the UN’s attempts to resolve these post-cold war 
crises that it has become widely seen as inadequate. In the Post-Cold 
War reality, these new situations have proven that past peacekeeping 
methods are in dire need of adjustment. Through a comparison of 
current and past UN operations by using the UN’s own criteria for 
success, this paper examines the dysfunction of contemporary 
peacekeeping. 
 
Defining the Problem: 
Current UN peacekeeping missions are still based on past UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) principles and 
definitions of success, but these operations are now encountering 
situations in which such principles simply cannot be abided by if any 
sort of success is to be achieved. The current UN operation in Darfur 
and the past missions in Lebanon and Somalia show how both 
contemporary and past missions do not meet the criteria of 
successful peacekeeping. According to the DPKO, a successful 
peacekeeping operation must: 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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 Be guided by the principles of consent, impartiality and the 
non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the 
mandate, 
 Be perceived as legitimate and credible and 
 Promote national and local ownership of the peace process in 
the host country.3 
 
The DPKO also lists some other criteria that drive a successful 
operation, these include: 
 Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in 
working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep), 
 Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching 
personnel, logistic and financial resources, 
 Unity of purpose within the Security Council, with active 
support to UN operations in the field, 
 Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and 
freedom of movement, 
 An integrated UN approach, effective coordination with 
other actors on the ground and good communication with 
host country authorities and population and 
 The utmost sensitivity towards the local population and 
upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good 
conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the 
problem).4 
 
The highly publicized and most recent United Nations mission is the 
African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID); a province of seven million in Western Sudan.5 In 2003, 
Darfurian Rebels in two groups known as the Sudanese Liberation 
                                                 
3 "Success in peacekeeping. United Nations Peacekeeping." The United Nations, 
accessed 8 December 2011, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/success. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Donald M. Snow, Cases in International Relations, 5th ed. (Boston: Pearson 
Longman, 2012), 158. 
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Army/Movement (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) openly opposed the Government of Sudan (GoS) over the 
extent to which Darfur was receiving central government resources. 
In response, the GoS enlisted informal militias known as the 
Janjaweed to attack Darfurian villages which were supposedly 
sympathetic to the rebel cause. The result was thousands of deaths 
and the internal displacement of over 2 million Darfurian residents as 
well as the flight of another 200,000 into Chad where they still live in 
desperation.6 
 
Four years later, in July of 2007, the UN Security Council passed 
resolution #1769 to authorize supplementing the 6,000 troops which 
the African Union had provided with a hybrid force of 26,000 
soldiers and 6,000 civilians along with other support forces.7  As of 
the 31st of July, 2011, the mission is still undermanned with fewer 
than 18,000 troops and just over 5,000 police forces.8 
 
According to the Darfur Relief and Documentation Center (DRDC), 
“the deployment of UNAMID in Darfur has played a positive role in 
creating relatively improved life conditions in areas of their 
presence.”9 However, they also report that the effect of UNAMID’s 
presence on the situation in Darfur is limited and remains precarious 
because of UNAMID’s weak capabilities and inability to cover the 
whole region.10 Progress is being made. Troop numbers continue to 
rise each year and the October 12, 2011 Report of the Secretary 
General stated increasing success at being granted access to regions 
in which the government had previously barred UN forces, regions 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 159 
7 Ibid., 162 
8 "UNAMID Facts and Figures - African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation 
in Darfur." The United Nations, accessed 8 December 2011, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml. 
9Abdelbagi Jibril. Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success? 
(Geneva: Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy, 2010), 24, 
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often essential to the operation.11 However, the DRDC also reports 
“ongoing efforts of the international community in Darfur are 
unlikely to succeed as most of the key recommendations made by the 
UN Security Council…have been sabotaged by the GoS.”12 Worse 
still, Security Council members have been accused of selling weapons 
to the GoS; an act violating UN resolutions.13 
 
Noting the UN’s principles of success, it is clear that in Darfur, there 
is no peace to keep, the mission is undermanned, Security Council 
members are fueling the conflict, and the Government of Sudan is 
resisting.14 In these respects, it is clear that UNAMID does not meet 
the UN’s criteria for success and it is therefore unsurprising that 
UNAMID is disparagingly viewed. In 2007 the BBC reported that 
“even after all 26,000 troops and police are deployed, they will not be 
able to stop the rebels, army, and pro-government militias from 
fighting if they really want to.”15 Donald M. Snow of the University 
of Alabama claims that “UNAMID has not only been unsuccessful 
but is also arguably an abject failure.”16 
 
Unfortunately, Darfur is not the only UN mission that breaks some 
of the DPKO’s principles. The United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) was launched in 1978 after the Israeli invasion, 
purposed with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring 
international peace and security, and assisting the government of 
                                                 
11 Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur. United Nations, accessed November 1, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/643. 
12 Jibril, 23 
13 David Blair, "Russia and China 'break Darfur arms embargo," Telegraph, May 9, 
2007, accessed October 16, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1551053/Russia-and-China-break-
Darfur-arms-embargo.html  
14 Hillary Andersson. "China 'is fuelling war in Darfur," BBC News, July13, 2008, 
accessed December 9, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7503428.stm. 
15 "Peacekeeping in Darfur." BBC News, August 1, 2007, accessed December 8, 
2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6144498.stm. 
16 Snow, 160. 
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Lebanon in ensuring the restoration of its authority.17 This was all 
impossible given that Israel refused to cooperate and maintained an 
occupation of the area, showing no commitment to work towards 
peace.18 
UNIFIL is far from the only other case. The UN operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) was initially launched with the intention of 
ensuring the delivery of humanitarian supplies but expanded its 
mandate when the US contributed troops. The mission’s original 
mandate was achieved and so mission was deemed a success.19 
However, with the resources of the United States, the UN attempted 
to disarm the lawless factions of the region and restore order. In this 
effort, rather than an effective joint command, troops were, for the 
most part, commanded by their respective countries. With such 
minimal cooperation, lightly armed soldiers engaged in warfare for 
which they were unprepared. According to Retired Colonel Terence 
O’Neil, “the end result was a sorry  
mess and a humiliating UN withdrawal.”20 
 
These cases illustrate the clear dysfunction of current UN 
peacekeeping missions that are still based on past UN DPKO 
principles and DPKO definitions of success. It is clear UN initiatives 
are encountering situations in which the principles simply cannot be 
abided by. Continuing this dysfunction is not without consequences.  
 
The Possible Consequences 
This analysis states three main consequences of current peacekeeping 
techniques: the continuation of the negative externalities of 
peacekeeping, the diminishing reputation of the UN, and the 
                                                 
17 Terence O'Neill. "UN Peacekeeping: Expectations and Reality." Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 13 (2002): 204 
18 Ibid. 
19 "United Nations Operation in Somalia I - (UNOSOM I)."  The United Nations, 
accessed November 16, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm. 
20 O’Neill, 204. 
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precedent these failed peacekeeping operations set for the rest of the 
world.  
Michael Lipson uses the term ‘Peacekeeping externalities’ to refer to 
the negative byproducts peacekeeping missions have produced in 
recent decades. These can include the “sexual exploitation of local 
populations by peacekeeping personnel, increased human trafficking 
to provide prostitution, and the consequent spread of HIV/AIDS.”21 
 
Negative externalities of UN operations have occurred as far back as 
1996, and have not shown signs of dissipating.22 In 2005, a UN 
inquiry found that UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo were sexually abusing girls as young as 13.23 In 2006, an article 
published in the Weekly Standard went so far as to suggest that 
“international peacekeeping missions are creating a predatory sexual 
culture among vulnerable refugees--from relief workers who demand 
sexual favors in exchange for food to U.N. troops who rape women 
at gunpoint.”24 In the same year, a BBC investigation in Haiti 
uncovered more allegations of sexual abuse of children by 
peacekeepers.25 Even the most recent mission in the Sudan has had 
its allegations.26 As listed in the criteria for success, peacekeeping that 
                                                 
21 Michael Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?" European Journal of 
International Relations 13 (2007): 5. 
22 Kofi Annan, "Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of 
armed conflict on children." United Nations Department for Policy Coordination 
and Sustainable Development (1996) accessed October 18, 2011, 
http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf. 
23 Susannah Price, "DR Congo sex abuse claims upheld, " BBC News, January 8, 
2005, accessed December 8, 2011, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4156819.stm. 
24 Joseph Loconte, "The U.N. Sex Scandal," The Weekly Standard, January 3, 2005, 
accessed December 8, 2011, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/081zxel
z.asp. 
25 "Fears over Haiti child 'abuse,'" BBC News, November 30, 2006, accessed 
December 8, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6159923.stm.  
26 Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, "UN staff accused of raping children in 
Sudan," Telegraph, January 2 2007, accessed December 8, 2011, 
7
McCarten: Contemporary Peacekeeping






25   Contemporary Peacekeeping 
 
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol.3, Iss.1, 2012, 18-40 
 
is doing harm to the populations it is supposed to protect is not 
effective peacekeeping.  
Promisingly, a paper published in International Peacekeeping in 2009 
analyzed the public health impact of HIV positive peacekeepers and 
found that “while misconduct by, and risk of infection among 
individual peacekeepers cannot be ruled out, there is strong evidence 
that as a rule peacekeeping does not pose a major public health 
concern in terms of HIV transmission to host countries.”27 
Unfortunately, the accusations that have been tossed around have 
already done a large amount of damage; and some countries already 
resist the deployment of troops from high HIV prevalence 
countries.28 
 
Peacekeeping externalities are issues the UN is aware of and claims to 
be addressing, but they are also a problem which the institution 
admits it has not solved.29 As long as the UN does not pursue 
effective reforms to prevent them, these externalities will continue to 
be a black mark on the reputation of the institution.  
 
This reputation is already being diminished by the publicly perceived 
ineffectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions as a whole. The UN is 
in dire need of a highly publicized successful mission to challenge the 
literature that is being published aimed at discrediting the 
organization. One example of this negative literature is the blunt 
analysis of the UN’s ability and failed attempts at reform by Joshua 
Muravchik, professor at the Institute of World Politics.30 Another 
potent example is be the 2004 book by Dori Gold, former Israeli 
                                                                                                             
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1538476/UN-staff-accused-of-
raping-children-in-Sudan.html. 
27 Massimo Lowiki-Zucca, Sarah Karmin, and Karl-Lorenz Dehne, "HIV among 
Peacekeepers and its Likely Impact on Prevalence on Host Countries' HIV 
Epidemics," International Peacekeeping 16 (2009): 361. 
28 Ibid., 352. 
29 “2010 United Nations Peace Operations: Year In Review,” The United Nations, 
accessed December 7, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2010.pdf. 
30 Joshua Muravchik, "The Case Against the UN," Commentary 118 (2004): 37. 
8
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ambassador to the UN, entitled Tower of Babble: How the United Nations 
Has Fueled Global Chaos.31 The starkest pieces of evidence for the 
damage which continued UN peacekeeping does to the institution’s 
reputation are the arguments that peacekeeping should be done by 
other forces32; or worse, that it should not be done at all.33 
 
Finally, one of the gravest consequences of not addressing the 
problem of ineffective peacekeeping is the precedent it sets for the 
rest of the world. This is particularly relevant to the world today 
given the “Arab Spring”; a wave of revolutionary protests occurring 
around the Arab world that have often been met with violent 
oppression by the ruling governments.34 This wave sparked 
revolution in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, but 
has been met with severe governmental crackdowns and gross 
violations of human rights. Additional protests have occurred in 
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco and Oman. These are situations in which humanitarian 
action could likely save lives.  
 
There is a growing awareness that UN peacekeeping missions are 
unlikely or ineffective, and that non-intervention in humanitarian 
disasters is tolerated, and this risks establishing a precedent in which 
oppressive regimes can abuse their citizens without fear of 
international condemnation. Consequently, the deterrent effect of 
UN action may be lost. This is clearly one of the most compelling 
                                                 
31 Dori Gold, Tower of babble: how the United Nations has fueled global chaos (New York: 
Crown Forum, 2004). 
32 Doug Brooks and Gaurav Laroia, "Privatized Peacekeeping," The National 
Interest (2005): 121–125. 
33 Greig, J. Michael and Paul F. Diehl, "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking 
Dilemma," International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005): 621-645; David Chandler, 
"Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace.’" International 
Peacekeeping 11 (2004): 59-81. 
34 "Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa -- country by country," CNN, 
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reasons why solutions must be found to current UN peacekeeping 
challenges.  
 
The Probable Causes: 
In “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?” Michael Lipson proposes 
that the UN is saying one thing and doing another as a response to 
conflicting pressures. His accusations arise from the situations in 
Bosnia and Rwanda when the Security Council passed resolutions 
authorizing peacekeepers to protect humanitarian safe areas and 
provide security but then failed to approve the necessary forces to 
actually do so.35 Lipson argues that these are instances not simply of 
hypocrisy in the ordinary sense of the word, but of ‘organized 
hypocrisy’, a phenomenon identified by organization theorists to 
explain how organizations respond to conflicting pressures in their 
external environment.36  Lipson explains that “as an organization 
charged with representing the nations of the world, the UN’s 
legitimacy rests largely on its ability to reflect external constituencies’ 
inconsistent values and preferences;” therefore, to be seen as 
representing the interests of each separate nation, “the UN has to 
uphold contradictory goals and principles.”37 
 
Organized hypocrisy provides the benefit of UN peacekeepers being 
able to pursue robust peacekeeping despite supposedly maintaining 
the peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and the non-use of 
force except in self-defense.38 Another benefit is that, through 
promises for reform but failure to actually pursue it, the UN 
“preserves the ability…to reflect the inconsistencies of its 
institutional environment, and thereby maintain support in the form 
of both legitimacy and material resources such as member-states’ 
dues.”39  
                                                 
35 Michael Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?" European Journal of 
International Relations 13 (2007): 5.  
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 Ibid., 12. 
38 Ibid., 19. 
39 Ibid., 22. 
10
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However, all things considered, there are also disadvantages. 
Responses to political and humanitarian crises are met by symbolic 
resolutions and are not supported by the resources or political 
commitment necessary to act effectively.40 Prime examples are the 
cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, where “passing Security Council 
Resolutions – organizational ‘decisions’ – diffused and deflected 
political pressure to act in response to ethnic cleansing and 
genocide.”41 Additionally, in the UN’s calls for reform, including the 
previously mentioned Brahimi report, organized hypocrisy creates 
repeated reform efforts that are not followed through and “the 
fundamental problems that the [reports attempt] to address will 
continue to persist.”42 
 
Whether or not one wants to call it hypocrisy, Lipson certainly 
reveals the contradictions within the institution’s actions that are a 
cause of inefficiency. Given the diminishing reputation of UN 
peacekeeping efforts, it would seem that the costs of Lipson’s 
organized hypocrisy have begun to outweigh the benefits.  
 
In another purported dysfunction, Philip Cunliffe makes the case that 
decision making in UN peacekeeping is not only disjointed between 
different states and actors, but is also critically lopsided from an 
uneven distribution of responsibilities with the strategic, political, and 
military risks falling on the poor and weak states least able to handle 
them.43 He attributes this problem to troop-contributing countries 
that may only be doing so in order to expand their possibilities for 
consultation within the Security Council, increasing their access to 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 14. 
41 Lipson, 15. 
42 Ibid., 16. 
43 Philip Cunliffe, "The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping, 
International Peacekeeping," International Peacekeeping 16 (2009): 323. 
11
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the major powers and their influence in UN affairs.44 This is one 
important boon of being a peacekeeping contributor.45 
 
This brings us to two important points: First, due to the institutional 
structure of the UN, decisions can be made and policies can be 
implemented with the decision-making states not bearing 
responsibility on the outcome of operations. This is a serious lack of 
accountability. And second, troop-contributing countries are 
continuing to do so in order to gain political influence with the 
institution, which means that it is the least well-off states that are 
providing underequipped and poorly trained troops and suffering the 
consequences. Figure One and Figure Two illustrate the dysfunction 
of troop versus financial contributions.46 
 
There are many other potential factors that influence the likelihood 
and degree of difficulty of peacekeeping missions. One further 
example is the action of other states advancing their own interests 
and even the actions of non-governmental organizations and 
institutions, some of whom have been accused of profiting from the 
conflicts that peacekeeping seeks to prevent.47 However, while these 
causes can be prominent, they are beyond the ability of UN 
peacekeeping to address, and therefore beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 326. 
45 Ibid. 
46Graphics provided by - Scott Firsing, "America and UN peacekeeping," Journal of 
International Peace Operations 7 (2011). 
47 Paul Williams, "Peace Operations and the International Financial Institutions: 
Insights from Rwanda and Sierra Leone." International Peacekeeping 11 (2004): 119. 
12
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As of September 2011: 
1. Bangladesh - 10,609 
2. Pakistan - 9,115  
3. India - 8,192  
4. Nigeria - 5,667  
5. Nepal - 4,333 
6. Ethiopia - 4,195  
7. Egypt - 4,118  
8. Jordan - 4,012  
9. Rwanda - 3,669 
10. Ghana - 2,991 
53. Canada – 197 
60. United States - 12348 
 
Figure 1 shows the top 10 peacekeeping troop contributing countries. Contributing 
expands countries possibilities for consultation within the Security Council, 
increasing their access to the major powers and their influence in UN affairs.   
                                                 
48
The United Nations."Troop and police contributors.United Nations 
Peacekeeping." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml 
(accessed December 9, 2011). 
13
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Top 10 Providers of Assessed Contributions (2011-2012):  
1. United States (27.14%) 
2. Japan (12.53%) 
3. United Kingdom (8.15%) 
4. Germany (8.02%) 
5. France (7.55%) 
6. Italy (5.00%) 
7. China (3.93%) 
8. Canada (3.21%) 
9. Spain (3.18%) 
10. R. of Korea (2.26%)49 
 
Figure 2 shows the cost of major American foreign policy related programs. This 
minor expenditure places the US as the top contributor at 27.14% of contributions 
in 2011-2012.The small green bar under State Dept/USAID/UN shows how 
minimal UN related contributions are. 
 
                                                 
49
The United Nations."Financing Peacekeeping." Welcome to the United 
Nations: It's Your World. . 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml#gadocs 
(accessed December 2, 2011). 
14
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Policy Options and Recommendations 
In 1998, Kofi Annan stated that the world may not be ready to 
privatize peace.50 Today, some argue this may no longer be the case.51 
Through multinationality and international cooperation, UN 
peacekeeping forces gain a certain amount of legitimacy, but it comes 
with a large number of operational difficulties. Arguments for 
privatized peacekeeping cite “a lack of common weaponry, of 
compatible communication systems, of similar operational 
experiences and doctrine, and sometimes of a shared language,” all as 
good reasons for why current peacekeeping efforts need 
privatization.52  Proponents argue that private military and security 
companies (PMSCs) have: “(1) better organization, training, and 
equipment; (2) heightened willingness to apply violence offensively in 
order to serve UN mandates; and (3) enhanced readiness to 
respond.”53 Already, although their participation has not widely been 
acknowledged, private companies have long been involved in 
peacekeeping operations.54 They are utilized to protect UN field 
offices, warehouses and personnel, and in a few instances even UN 
mandates.55 
 
As PMSCs are being used to fill some of the gaps conventional 
peacekeeping forces are leaving behind, it is easy to imagine an entire 
private force to enforce a UN mandate in a region, particularly when 
private sector services routinely cost the UN 10-40 percent of what it 
costs for similar state-provided services as they are used today.56 But 
financial benefits must be weighed against a loss of accountability and 
regulation of peacekeeping troops. Using PMSCs as peacekeepers is a 
                                                 
50 Kofi Annan, "Intervention." Paper presented at 35th Annual Ditchley 
Foundation Lecture, United Kingdom, June 26, 2008.  
51 Christopher Spearin, "UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military 
and Security Industry." International Peacekeeping 18 (2011): 196. 
52 Ibid., 197. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Brooks and Laroia,122. 
55 Ibid., 122. 
56 Ibid., 123. 
15
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controversial and still hypothetical solution to conventional 
peacekeeping difficulties and its logistical, political, and ethical 
viability have yet to be fully determined. Using soldiers of fortune to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war seems counter-
intuitive and leaves a bad taste in the mouths of those who would see 
a world without violence. Nevertheless, the option poses an 
intriguing solution to current peacekeeping challenges.  
 
Beyond arguments for privatization, there are solutions that can still 
be pursued within the UN sphere. This paper provides two 
antithetical directions UN Peacekeeping can potentially move toward 
in order tobecome more effective; robust peacekeeping and 
promoting peace culture.  
Thierry Tardy offers a critique of robust peacekeeping in 
contemporary peace operations to determine whether or not it is a 
viable solution. The concept of robust peacekeeping emerged after 
the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica where UN peacekeepers did 
little to stop the massive violations of human rights.57 As a result, the 
majority of the new mandates have authorized peacekeepers to use 
‘all necessary means to protect civilians when under imminent threat 
of physical violence’ and new operations increasingly include the idea 
that peacekeepers must be given the political and operational means 
to successfully implement their mandate.58 Robustness is designed to 
allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to provide freedom of 
maneuver, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the 
mandate and the peace process is obstructed.59 However, the UN has 
always had difficulty reconciling its central role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security with the idea of coercion beyond the 
principle of state sovereignty; our analysis of Darfur is a prime 
example. Tardy finds “the nature of the organization, its broad 
composition, and the politics within its main organs have made 
                                                 
57 Thierry Tardy, "A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace 
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coercion conceptually and practically ambiguous.”60 Therefore, 
robustness essentially falls into ‘the grey area of peacekeeping’, 
somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, 
and it thus challenges the DPKO’s key principles.61 
 
Fundamentally, the concept implies a willingness to use force in 
order to prevent atrocity and stop conflict in circumstances where 
there is either no peace to keep, or where doing so would be a 
violation of a country’s sovereignty, but it is basically impossible for 
the UN to do so and maintain its legitimacy as a neutral institution. 
Operationally, robust peacekeeping is equally undermined by the 
commitment gap in troop contributions, financial support, and the 
absence of Western states in UN operations.62 
 
Robust Peacekeeping clearly faces some serious challenges if it is to 
be implemented. Reforms that better arm peacekeepers and mandates 
that allow for increased use of force are useless so long as 
peacekeepers are continually restricted by the UN’s main principles 
of peacekeeping. For Robust Peacekeeping to be a viable solution, it 
needs to the resource contributions materialize and it needs to have 
set, clear guidelines that member states all agree on  that lay out 
conditions under which sovereignty can be violated.  
 
Taking peacekeeping away from the use of force and towards a softer 
solution, there is an argument emerging from many scholars that 
“culture, redefined specifically as peace culture, can have a more 
proactive role in terms of mobilizing energies for sustainable peace 
building at different states of the conflict spectrum.”63,64 This is the 
idea that a ‘culture of peace’ must overcome our current ‘culture of 
                                                 
60 Tardy, 153. 
61 Ibid., 165. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Tom Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture and Conflict 
Resolution." International Peacekeeping 17 (2010): 486. 
64 Douglas J Roche,The Human Right to Peace (Toronto: Novalis, 2003), 110. 
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war.’ This is examined in detail by Douglas Roche in his book The 
Human Right to Peace.65 
 
A culture of peace seeks to transform the cultural tendencies toward 
war and violence into a culture where dialogue, respect, and fairness 
govern social relations, and it has examples of success.66 Thus far, the 
primary channel through which peace culture has been used is the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). In its Culture of Peace pilot project, UNESCO helped 
to bring together the conflicting forces in the 12-year El Salvador 
war, aiding their negotiations and decision making by involving them 
in the planning and implementation of human development projects; 
one successful example was the production of daily radio broadcasts 
and educational campaigns directed at the most needy in the 
country.67 Translating this cultural UNESCO success into successful 
peacekeeping, Thomas Woodhouse explores this idea of culture as a 
contributory factor in the emergence of what he and others term 
“cosmopolitan peacekeeping.”68 
 
In this redefined peacekeeping, Woodhouse proposes a model in 
which a peace culture is added to peacekeeping’s three conventional 
goals; security, humanitarianism, and politics.69 In its fourth function, 
UN peacekeepers represent and adopt the symbols of a pacifist 
global order, the opposite of state-based militarism.70 A culture of 
peace seeks “a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of 
life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root 
causes, solving problems through dialogue and negotiation among 
individuals, groups, and nations.”71 This is a culture that can be 
promoted by all forms of cultural creativity: music, drama, cinema, 
                                                 
65 Roche, 100. 
66Ibid., 107-108. 
67Ibid., 109. 
68 Woodhouse, 486. 
69 Ibid., 491. 
70 Ibid., 486. 
71 Woodhouse, 492. 
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and so on. In particular, the use of sport has historically proven itself 
an effective conflict mediator.72,73 
 
Peace Culture, then, is a far softer solution and is in many ways far 
more agreeable to member states who are attempting to protect their 
sovereignty. It may seem peculiar to have our armed UN 
peacekeepers promoting cultural activities, but granting that it is 
perceived differences that drive human beings to kill one another, 
focusing on our similarities could be a potent cure to any conflict. 
Additionally, because organizations such as UNESCO and other 
Humanitarian NGO’s already exist, if all of these organizations can 
cooperate, Cosmopolitan peacekeeping would not demand the 
resources that Robust Peacekeeping does. Nevertheless, for those 
who still feel the injustice done in Rwanda and Darfur could have 
been prevented by affirmative action, Robustness will still seem like 
the practical solution.  
 
In Conclusion 
In the Post-Cold War reality, new situations have proven past 
peacekeeping methods are in dire need of adjustment. Through a 
comparison of current and past UN operations with the UN’s stated 
factors of success, this paper has revealed the dysfunction of 
contemporary peacekeeping. It has listed the potential consequences 
if this inadequacy continues and has examined potential causes of 
that inadequacy. Finally, this paper has outlined the proposed 
solution of privatized peacekeeping, and internally, two different 
directions the UN could pursue, one in which peacekeepers become 
a more robust, forceful, and effective force, or one in which a 
cosmopolitan peace culture is integrated into the peacekeeping 
principles. New problems require new solutions; we can only hope 
the UN, its member states, and the powerful countries that drive our 
world will pursue them.  
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